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ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION

AWARDS IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE CURRENT PROGRESS
AND SETBACKS
Pablo Letelier Cibid

IN

the past several years, there has been remarkable growth in promoting international arbitration in Latin America.' The enactment
of modern international arbitration laws has been complemented by
the flourishing of local arbitration institutions and the increasing tendency of Latin American courts to interpret the United Nations' 1958
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
2
Awards ("New York Convention") in light of pro-arbitration policies.
Particularly, recent decisions from Colombian, Chilean and Brazilian
courts demonstrate a shared inclination to restrict the scope of the public
policy exception set forth in Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention
only to cases where international arbitration awards contradict the most
fundamental principles of the enforcement forum's legal system, exclud3
ing mere inconsistencies from mandatory norms of domestic law.
Despite the efforts of many, not all Latin American countries show the
same enthusiasm toward the growth of international arbitration. In the
past few years, Argentinian courts have consistently recognized the
award-debtor has the right to resist the enforcement of an international
arbitration award on the basis of a broad public policy exception covering
virtually all norms of Argentinian domestic law. 4 In a recent decision, a

-

1. Andr6s Jana, International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America: Myths and
Realities, 32 J. INT't. Al3. 413, 420 (2015).
2. Id. at 421.
3. See Alberto Zuleta & Rafael Rinc6n, Country Report - Colombia, in Rvioiz-r ON
ExcrllON IN TIrii NEw YORK CONVENTION 9, 1-13 (Eduardo
THu PuBuc Poicy
Silva Romero & Pascal Hollander eds., 2015), available at http://www.ibanet.org/
LPD/DisputeResolutionSection/Arbitration/RecogntnEnfrcemntArbitlAw
rd/publicpolicyl5.aspx.; See Jos6 Antonio Moreno Rodriguez, Country Report
Chile, Paraguay, MERCOSUR, Pert, Venezuela, in REPORT ON TI-lE PuLIc POLicy EXCEFFION IN fri-Ri NE~w YORK CONVENTION 8, 1-18 (Eduardo Silva Romero
& Pascal Hollander eds., 2015), available at http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/DisputeResolution-Section/Arbitration/RecogntnEnfrcemntArbitlAwrd/public
policyl5.aspx.; see also Leonardo V. P. de Oliveira & Isabel Miranda, International
Public Policy and Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in
Brazil, 30 J. INT'L.. ARm. 49, 55 (2013).
4. Noiana Marigo, Country Report - Argentina & Uruguay, in Rivolr ON TIII Puniic Poicy Exc:I:vnIoN IN -ri NEw YORK CONVENTION (Eduardo Silva Romero
& Pascal Hollander eds., 2015), available at http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Dispute
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local court suggested that the Argentinian judiciary should maintain the
power to review the public policy implications of investment arbitration
awards,5 a prerogative explicitly barred by Articles 53 and 54 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States. 6
Against such a background, this article attempts to present an updated
account of how the Latin American jurisdictions differently interpret
public policy as a means to limit the enforcement of international arbitration awards. Section I introduces the public policy exception under the
New York Convention and underlines its challenges in the Latin American context. Section II discusses the case of Colombia, the Latin American jurisdiction that has demonstrated the most restrictive application of
the public policy exception. Section III presents the cases of Chile and
Brazil, where domestic courts have recognized the idea of international
public policy. Both countries are moving toward a more restrictive interpretation similar to Colombia. Section IV explains how Argentinian local
courts have tended to expand the idea of public policy in order to retain
discretion in reviewing substantive implications of international arbitral
awards.
I.

THE EXCEPTION OF PUBLIC POLICY BEFORE
LATIN AMERICAN COURTS

Under most arbitration regimes around the world, national courts are
deemed to favor the enforcement and recognition of international arbitral awards. 7 Most modern arbitration legislation is inspired in a pro-enforcement approach, which implies national courts recognize and compel
the performance of international arbitral awards that comply with basic
jurisdictional requirements.8 This approach is consistent with the international arbitration system framed by the New York Convention, which
provides for the presumptive recognition of arbitral awards. 9
ResolutionSection/Arbitration/RecogntnEnfrcemntArbitl_Awrd/publicpolicy

15.aspx.
5. Bruchou, Fernandez Madero & Lombardi Abogados, FirstArgentine Court Judgment on the Recognition of an ICSID Award, KLUWER ARBI3TRATION BLOG, http://

kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/03/1.5/first-argentine-court-judgment-on-the-recognition-of-an-icsid-award/?print=print.
6. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc
en-archive/ICSID-English.pdf [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
7. See e.g., Pierre Mayer & Audley Sheppard, Final Report on Public Policy as a Bar
to Enforcement of InternationalArbitral Awards, 19 Aiu3. INT'L. 249, 250 (2003).
8. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law's Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration recognizes this trend by presumptively requiring the recognition of an international arbitral award, provided that the awarddebtor does not demonstrate the application of very narrow defined exceptions.
See UNCITRAL Model Law, Art. 36, G.A. Res. 40/72, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (June
21, 1985), revised in 2006, G.A. Res 61/33, U.N. Doc. A/61/33 / (Dec. 4, 2006).
9. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARiBITRATION 3413 (Wolters
Kluwer ed., Kluwer Law International 2nd ed. 2014) (2009).
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Among the few reasons to oppose enforcement recognized by the New
York Convention, perhaps the most controverted, is the so-called public
policy exception.' 0 According to Article V(2)(b), national courts may
deny the request for recognition and enforcement of an international arbitration award if the enforcement and recognition of such award "would
be contrary to the public policy of that country."'I Unsurprisingly, the
elusiveness of the provision affords the award-debtor a formidable tool to
oppose enforcement in almost any imaginable scenario.
As noted by Gary Born, the fact that public policy could be as unpredictable as an "unruly horse" is one of the favorite clich6s of international
arbitration.1 2 Naturally, this unpredictability makes the delimitation of
the public policy exception a highly controversial issue.1 3 In order to advance the pro-recognition aspirations of the New York Convention, some
jurisdictions have attempted to limit the application of the public policy
exception only to those cases in which the award violates a body of universally recognized principles referred to as "international public policy." 14 The Latin American countries demonstrate, however, that this
solution has not put an end to the unpredictability associated with Article
V(2)(b) of the New York Convention.
It has been suggested that Latin American legal systems are bound by
a close affinity.' 5 All Latin American countries have ratified the New
York Convention, and many are also part of the Panama Convention.16
Importantly, a great majority of the Latin American countries have recently enacted arbitration legislation inspired in the UNCITRAL Model
Law. This normative framework suggests that, at least in principle, Latin
American jurisdictions share a commitment to the regime of enforcement
and recognition of. arbitral awards set forth in the New York
Convention.' 7
Nevertheless, practitioners and commentators have long considered
Latin America as the home of idiosyncratic courts determined to control
arbitration procedures as just another part of the national system of judi10. Mayer & Sheppard, supra note 7, at 250.
11. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, Art. V § 2b,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, available at http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/New-York-Convention-E.pdf.
12. Born, supra note 9, at 3653.
13. See Jan Paulsson, The New York Convention in International Practice - Problems
ofAssimilation, in 9 ASA SPECIAL SERIES, Ti-i Niw YORK CONVENTION OF 1958
112 (Marc Blessing ed., 1996).
14. See e.g., Mayer and Sheppard, supra note 7, at 251.
15. See Alejandro Garro, Unification and Harmonization of Private Law in Latin
America, 40 (3) AM. J. Come. L. 587, 587-616 (1992).
16. To date, the Inter-American Convention on Arbitration ("Panama Convention")
has been ratified by Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Guatemala; Honduras; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; the United States; Uruguay; and Venezuela.
Organization of American States, B-35: Inter American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, available at http://
www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-35.htm1
17. See Jana,supra note 1, at 420-21.
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cial administration.1 8 In this context, the public policy exception has been
recognized as one of the major dangers to the validity of international
arbitration awards in Latin America.19 It is not difficult to imagine how
an idiosyncratic court could use the exception as a suitable excuse to
shield Latin American states against undesirable awards. 20
Case law suggests, however, that the trend among Latin American
courts is to restrict the application of the public policy exception in order
to favor the enforcement of international arbitration awards. 2 1 Indeed,
recent decisions demonstrate that a majority of jurisdictions have
adopted the notion of international public policy, and that those jurisdictions' local courts tend to reject broad interpretations of the public policy
exception. 22 As the following sections show, the fact that Latin American
domestic courts reason in somewhat analogous terms suggests that a consensus could develop in the region.
II.

RADICAL LIMITATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION: THE COLOMBIAN CASE

National courts in Colombia have traditionally showed a very careful
approach to the public policy exception, not only in international arbitration, but while deciding the recognition of every foreign judgment. 23 The
Colombian Supreme Court has repeatedly found that the idea of public
policy should be defined in accordance with international standards as an
extreme limit to the enforcement of foreign decisions in a globalized context. 24 This position is justified due to the need to promote transnational
commerce and to develop an effective system of private international
law.25

The international dimension of public policy has been especially emphasized while deciding the enforcement of international arbitration
18. Id. at 424 ("The fear is that judges in Latin America remain idiosyncratic and carry
on the customs of legal culture that are incompatible with international arbitration,
characterized by their overall power to intervene in decisions of arbitrators, whose
work is often considered part of the national system of judicial administration.").
19. See Felipe Ossa, El Orden Pablico en el Arbitraje Comercial Internacional:La Experiencia Chilena y Comparada, in ARBITRAJE COMERCIAL INTERNACIONA L:
RECONOCIMIENTo v EmCUCION DE SENTENCIAS Y LAUDOs ARBITRALES Ex-

TRANJEROs 331, 332 (Magaly McLean & Jaime Moreno-Valle eds., 2012).
20. See Elina Mereminskaya, El Camino se Hace al Andar: Recurso de Nulidad en la
Jurisprudencia Latinoamericana, in ARIrITRAJE COMERCIAL INTERNACIONAL:
RiECONOCIMIENTO Y EJECUCION DE1 SENTENCIAS Y LAUDos ARI31TRALES ExTRANJEizos 309, 321 (Magaly McLean & Jaime Moreno-Valle eds., 2012).
21. See Zuleta & Rinc6n, supra note 3, at 9; see also Moreno Rodrfguez, supra note 3,
at 8; see also V. P. de Oliveira & Isabel Miranda supra note 3, at 49.
22. Id.
23. See Zuleta & Rinc6n supra note 3, at 2.
24. See Diego FernAndez Arroyo, La Evoluci6n del Arbitraje en America Latina: De la
Supuesta Hostilidad a la Evidente Aceptacidn, 3 REVISTA DE DERECHO
COMERCIAL DEL CONSUMIDOR Y DE LA EMPRESA

317, 324 (2012) (Arg.).

25. See Juan F. Rolddn Pardo, El Estado del Arte del Concepto de Orden Pablico Internacional en el Ambito del Derecho Internacional Privado ?y el Arbitraje Interna-

44 REVISTA DEI DERECI-o
26-27 (2010) (Colom.).
cional,

PIlVADO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD

)8 Los ANDES

1,
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awards. Colombian courts have clearly distinguished between international and domestic mandatory laws, restricting the scope of Article
V(2)(b) of the New York Convention to "the most basic and fundamental
principles of Colombian juridical institutions." 2 6 These fundamental
principles only include very limited and basic principles of the law, such
as good faith, impartiality of the arbitral tribunal, and due process. 27 To
date, the Colombian Supreme Court has never refused the enforcement
of a foreign arbitral award on grounds of international public policy. 2 8
This view is evident in the Colombian Supreme Court decision in Petrotesting Colombia S.A. y Southeast Investment Corporationv. Ross Energy S.A. ("Petrotesting").29 In this decision, the Colombian Supreme
Court enforced an international arbitration award dealing with a dispute
regarding the exploitation of an oil concession in Colombia.3 0 In the Petrotesting case, the award-debtor opposed recognition arguing that the
award violated Colombian public policy.31 According to that party's position, the award ruled on the obligations of the parties under a contract
for the purchase of Colombian oil, which should be governed by
mandatory norms of public policy-specifically by Articles 2 and 10 of
the Colombian Petroleum Code. 32 Because the arbitral tribunal disregarded the provisions of the Columbian Petroleum Code in settling the
dispute, the award-debtor claimed the arbitration award violated Colombian public policy and should not be enforced.3 3
In its decision, the Colombian Supreme Court noted that Article
V(2)(b) of the New York Convention was applicable only to violations of
the most basic and fundamental principles of Colombian legal institutions. 34 Referring to a variety of international authorities, the Court
noted that the public policy exception should cover only violations to international public policy, a concept that differed from the imperative
norms of domestic law.35 Thus, a mere discrepancy between an international arbitration award and internal public policy provisions was insuffi36
cient for opposing recognition under the New York Convention.
Contrary to what the award-debtor argued, the Court found that the contract between the parties did not regulate the purchase of oil, which indeed was governed by Colombian Petroleum Code, but instead governed
the acquisition of property over the consortium that operated the oil conSee Zuleta & Rinc6n, supra note 3, at 3.
Id.
Zuleta & Rinc6n, supra note 3, at 8.
Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] (Supreme Court), 27 julio 2011, "Petrotesting
Colombia S.A. y Southeast Investment Corporation c. Ross Energy S.A.," Rol de
la causa: 11001-0203-000-2007-01956-00 (Colom.), available at http://newyorkconventionl958.org/index.php?lvI=notice-display&id=504.
30. Id. at 72.

26.
27.
28.
29.

31. Id. at 38.
32. Id. at 38.

33. Id. at 37-38.
34.

Id. at 46-47.

35. Id. at 39-40.
36.

Id. at 47.
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cession.37 Therefore, the arbitral award could not have violated the provisions of Colombian Petroleum Code, applicable only to oil purchases. 38
Based on these reasons, the Court rejected the public policy exception
and granted the recognition of the arbitral award. 39
This precedent was used by the Colombian Supreme Court to go a step
further while deciding another public policy case, Drummond Ltda. v.
Ferroviasen Liquidaci6n and FerrocarrilesNacionales de Colombia S.A.
("Drummond"). 40 There, the Colombian Supreme Court rejected a public policy exception invoked by the Colombian Ministry of Transportation
involving a contract between a French party and the Colombian National
Railroad Company. 41 In this case, the Court quoted the Petrotestingcase
to affirm an award that imposed fines on the National Railroad Company
in disregard of Colombian Administrative Law. 4 2
Once again, the Court concluded that deference to public policy did
not imply complying with all the imperative norms of domestic law. 4 3
This time, however, the Court added that even if the arbitration award
had violated the rules of Colombian Administrative Law, such violation
would not have sufficed to trigger the public policy exception under the
New York Convention. 44 As in the Petrotestingcase, the Court rejected
the opposition of the award-debtor and ordered the enforcement of the
international arbitration award. 4 5
The discussed decisions show that Colombian courts have adopted a
clear distinction between domestic and international public policy with
the intention of restricting the application of the public policy exception
as much as possible. 4 6 This restriction has allowed Colombian courts to
recognize international arbitration awards that disregard imperative
norms of domestic law-even those norms regulating areas in which the
Colombian State had a clear vested interest, such as the exploitation of
non-renewable natural resources, and the operation of public transportation. 47 As explained below, other Latin American jurisdictions have
started to move in the same direction.

37. Id. at 68.

38.

Id. at 47-49.

39. Id.
40. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] (Supreme Court), 19 diciembre 2011, "Drum-

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

mond Ltda. c. Ferrovias en Liquidaci6n and Ferrocarriles Nacionales de Colombia
S.A.," 1100102030002008-01760-00 (Colom.) available at http://newyorkconventionl958.org/index.php?IviN2tice display&id=506.
See Zuleta & Rinc6n, supra note 3, at 9.
See Zuleta & Rinc6n, supra note 3, at 9.
"Drummond Ltda. c. Ferrovias en Liquidaci6n and Ferrocarriles Nacionales de
Colombia S.A.," supra note 40, at 33.
Id. at 32.
See Zuleta & Rinc6n, supra note 3, at 9.
See Zuleta & Rinc6n, supra note 3, at 3.
See generally Zuleta & Rinc6n, supra note 3, at 3.
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III. INCREASING LIMITATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION: THE CHILEAN AND BRAZILIAN CASES
Similar to other Latin American jurisdictions, international arbitration
48
has increasingly developed in Chile and Brazil over the last ten years.
In 2004, Chile enacted an international arbitration law closely following
the UNCITRAL Model Law, and ever since, a wealth of legal scholarship
has stressed the need of turning Chile into an attractive arbitration
venue. 4 9 On the other hand, the sustained growth of the Brazilian economy and its important place in international trade have led Brazilian
50
courts to provide continuous support for international arbitration. The
case law in both jurisdictions reveal a similar tendency toward the restriction of the public policy exception.
A.

THE CHILEAN CASE

Since the enactment of international arbitration law, Chilean scholars
have argued time and time again that the public policy exception'should
be restricted to very exceptional cases.5 1 Following this lead, local courts
have gradually accepted that public policy in international arbitration is
52
This
something different from national or internal mandatory norms.
evolution can be traced to a series of decisions in which Chilean courts
tended to evaluate the validity of international awards, considering only
53
the most fundamental rules and principles of domestic law.
54
In Publicis Groupe Holdings B. V. v. Arbitro Manuel Josi Vial, for
48.
49.
50.
51.

See Moreno Rodriguez supra note 3, at 8; see also V. P. de Oliveira & Isabel Miranda supra note 3, at 49.
See e.g., Marfa Fernanda Visquez, Recepcidn del Arbitraje Comercial Internacional
en Chile desde una 6ptica jurisprudencial: una revision ineludible, 38 REvISTA
CIlLENA DIo Diticvio 349, 349-370 (2011) (Chile).
See V. P. de Oliveira & Isabel Miranda, supra note 3, at 57.
S. MArquez, "El Orden Pablico y su Funci6n como Limite a la Eficacia,
Reconocimiento y Ejecuci6n de los Laudos Arbitrales Internacionales en Chile"
[The Public Order and Its Function], REVISTA DEL MA-;fSTER v DocroRADo EN
DEREciio, FACULTAD DE DEITCO DE L.A UNIVERSIDAD

DE CII-rIE, No 3, 205.

(2009-2010); Juan Carlos Marin Gonzalez & Rolando Garcia Mir6n, El Concepto
de Orden Pablico Como Causal de Nulidad de un Laudo Tratdndose de un Arbitraje Comercial Internacional, 24 REVISTA DE DEREcilo DI1 VALIoVIA 117, 127128 (2011) (Chile).
52. See Moreno Rodriguez, supra note 3, at 8.
53. See e.g., Corte de Apelaciones [C. Apel.] [Court of Appeals], 10 abril 2014, "Constructora EMEX Limitada con Organizaci6n Europea para la Investigaci6n Astron6mica en el Hemisferio Sur ESO," Rol de la causa: 9211-2012 (Chile), availableat
http://corte.poderjudicial.cl/SITCORTEPORWEB/DownloadFile.do?TIP-Documento=3&TIP Archivo=1&COD-Opcion=1&COD Corte=90&CRRIdTramite=
10143966&CRR_IdDocumento=8786084 Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 15 september 2008, "Gold Nutrition Industria y comercio v.
Laboratorios Garden House S.A.", Rol de la causa: 6615-2007 (Chile), available at
ahttp://suprema.poderjudicial.cl/SITSUPPORWEB/DownloadFile.do?TIP_Documento=3&TIPArchivo=3&CODOpcion=1&CODCorte=1 &CRR_1dTramite=484667&CRR IdDocumento=279200.
54. Corte de Apelaciones [C. Apel.] (court of appeals), 4 abril 2009, "Publicis Groupe
Holdings B.V. c. Arbitro Manuel Jos6 Vial," Rol de la causa: 9134-2007 (Chile),
available at http://corte.poderjudicial.cl/SITCORTEPORWEB/DownloadFile.do?
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instance, the award-debtor requested the annulment of an international
arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator failed to consider expert
reports offered during the proceedings.5 5 In the opinion of the requesting
party, the demeanor of the arbitrator violated basic rules of due process
and thus Chilean public policy. The Court concluded that the expert report was actually considered by the arbitrator, so no violation of due process could have existed. 56 But, in dictum, the Court clarified that Chilean
procedural public policy should be interpreted restrictively and limited
only to the fundamental basic rules of the State.57
Recently, Chilean courts have taken an important step forward by expressly recognizing the distinction between international and domestic
public policy.5 8 As noted by commentators, this notion is quite innovative for Chilean law and represents an adherence to the standards recognized by international arbitration institutions. 59 The Santiago Court of
Appeals confirmed this trend in an important decision that has been celebrated by local commentators as a demonstration of Chilean courts' commitment to international arbitration. 60
In Vergara Varas v. Costa Ramirez ("Vergara Varas"),61 the losing
party in an international arbitration between the shareholders of a Chilean wine company requested the annulment of the award before Chilean
courts. 62 The requesting party argued that the award infringed the principle of due process as it granted a provisional measure without giving the
respondent an opportunity to oppose it.63 Additionally, the requesting
party argued that the award violated the Chilean rules on the taking of
evidence because the arbitrator only received evidence regarding the issues raised by the claimant. 64 These infractions of Chilean basic procedural norms would render the award incompatible with Chilean public
TIPDocumento=3&TIP Archivo=i&CODOpcion=1&CODCorte=90&CRR_
IdTramite=2690304&CRR_IdDocumento=2287810.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. "Publicis Groupe Holdings B.V. c. Arbitro Manuel Jos6 Vial." At 395.
58. See Moreno Rodriguez supra note 3, at 8
59. ("[L]os tribunales Chilenos han aceptado la idea de orden piblico internacional.
Tal definici6n resulta innovadora para el derecho chileno, pero se efecttia con un
estricto apego a los estindares universalmente reconocidos. Dicha definici6n se
basa en aquella elaborada en el afio 2000 por la Asociaci6n del Derecho Internacional a trav6s de su Comit6 de Arbitraje Comercial Internacional".) Mereminskaya, supra note 20, at 332.
60. Maria Fernanda Visquez, Ley chilena de arbitrajecomercial internacional:Andlisis
de las doctrinasjurisprudenciales, a diez afdos de su vigencia, 21 IUS E- PRAXIS 523,

535 (2015) (Chile).

61.

62.

Corte de Apelaciones [C. Apel.] (court of appeals), 9 septiembre 2013, "Vergara
Varas c. Costa Ramirez," Rol de la causa: 1971-2012 (Chile) http://corte.poderjudi
cial.cl/SITCORTEPORWEB/DownloadFile.do?TIPDocumento=3&TIPArchivo
=1&CODOpcion=1&CODCorte=90&CRRIdTramite=9049698&CRR IdDocu
mento=7828233 (last visited July 22, 2016).
Id.

63. Id.
64. Id. at section 8.
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65

The Santiago Court of Appeals ruled that Chilean international arbitration law authorized arbitral tribunals to conduct international arbitration proceedings without applying the procedural rules governing
domestic arbitration. 66 Importantly, the Court underlined that the only
limit to the validity of an international arbitration award was its compliance with international public policy, a concept that differed from Chilean public policy. 6 7 In the Court's view, a public policy defense should be
granted only when the most fundamental legal principles of Chilean law
are infringed, as when the arbitrator violates procedural equality between
the parties, due process, or is involved in fraud or another form of corruption.68 The Court concluded that the omission of Chilean rules of civil
procedure was not a violation of Chilean public policy, and therefore re69
jected the request for annulment presented by the award-debtor.
As this case shows, Chilean courts have followed the Colombian lead
in adopting a restricted version of the public policy exception to promote
international arbitration. 70 Unlike Colombian courts, however, Chilean
courts have not had the opportunity to decide cases in which the infringement of substantive norms of public law is at stake. The direction that
Chilean courts will take in this kind of case is still an open question.
B.

THE BRAZILIAN CASE

While the Brazilian courts strongly support international arbitration,
they have not yet produced relevant decisions dealing with the scope of
the public policy exception. According to commentators, Brazilian case
71
law on public policy remains in an "embryonic stage."
Even so, the absence of relevant decisions has not prevented local
scholars from developing a sound doctrine on the role that the public
policy exception should play under Brazilian arbitration law. The drafters of the Brazilian arbitration law have made very clear that the provision recognizing the public policy exception should be interpreted in
harmony with the best international standards. This position was strongly
stated in a recent publication:
If Brazil wishes to be an attractive forum for arbitration, courts
should not approach the issue [of the public policy exception]
through a purely internal perspective. In doing so, Brazil would be
navigating against the tide of the position already adopted by many
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id. at section 16.
Id. at section 18.
Id. at section 17.
In Vergara Varas, the Santiago Court of Appeals recognized this objective in unmistakable terms. See Id. at section 6b.
71. "Despite the favourable scenario, decisions regarding public policy are still at an
embryonic stage and international public policy or truly international public policy
has not been addressed directly in the context of arbitration." Oliveira & Miranda, supra note 3, at 58.
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jurisdictions, which in turn would set back the modern approach to
arbitration that Brazil has already developed. In this sense, the BAA
[Brazilian Arbitration Act] should be interpreted in the same way as
public policy would be when the decision of a foreign court is being
enforced in Brazil, that is, in accordance with private international
law (sometimes called international public policy or truly international public policy) as opposed to the public policy used to decide
domestic affairs. 72
Brazilian courts' recent decisions have implicitly recognized a notion of
international public policy similar to that advanced by Colombian and
Chilean courts. Traces of this implied recognition can be found in the
case Keytrade AG v. Ferticitrus Indtistria e Comdrcio de Fertilizantes
73
("Keytrade").
In this case, the award-creditor sought the recognition of an international arbitration award granting compound interests against the respondent in a case of breach of contract. 74 The award-debtor opposed the
recognition of the award based on two grounds.7 5 First, the award-debtor
argued that it had not been duly notified of the arbitral proceedings in the
terms provided by Brazilian procedural law. 76 Second, the award-debtor
argued that Brazilian law forbade usury in all forms, and thus an award
granting compound interests was against Brazilian public policy. 7 7
The Court rejected both arguments. Regarding the validity of notifications, the Court found that they were made in compliance with the arbitration law chosen by the parties, which allowed email notifications.7 8
The fact that Brazilian procedural law was not applied could not entail a
violation of public policy, as Brazilian international arbitration law provided that procedural aspects of arbitration shall be governed by the law
chosen by the parties.7 9
While rejecting the second argument, however, the Court developed
the most important part of the decision. According to the Court, in order
to demonstrate a public policy violation under Brazilian international arbitration law, the party opposing enforcement could not rely solely on a
departure from Brazilian domestic law in regards to the award.8 0 Instead,
to succeed, the party should demonstrate that the award threatens the
fundamental values of the Brazilian legal system.8
72. Id. at 57.
73. S.T.J. Corte Especial, Ap. No. 4024/EX (2010/0073632-7), Relator: Nancy Andrighi, 7.8.2013 (Braz.) http://newyorkconventionl958.org/index.php?Ivl=notice
display&id=1604 (last visited July 22, 2016).
74. Id. at 5.

75. Id. at 7.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 6-7.

80. Id.
81. Id. at 7.
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In this case, the public policy allegation relied on the fact that the
award granted compound interests, which allegedly contradicted Brazil's
general prohibition of usury. 82 The Court considered that such general
contradiction with Brazilian substantive law was not enough to trigger the
public policy exception, as Brazilian law recognized compound interests
in certain types of contracts.8 3 Therefore, it was not possible to argue
that the award threatened the fundamental values of the Brazilian legal
system. 84
Though Brazilian tribunals have not expressly adopted the concept of
international public policy, the Keytrade case demonstrates that Brazilian
courts tend to reason in similar terms as their Colombian and Chilean
counterparts. It would not be surprising if international public policy
were explicitly introduced in a decision to come. Case law and academic
commentary suggest that Brazil is following a path similar to that taken
by Colombia and Chile.
IV.

EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION: THE ARGENTINIAN CASE

Argentinian courts have taken quite a different position regarding the
scope of the public policy exception. As indicated by the International
Bar Association, Argentinian courts have consistently considered the notion of public policy from a purely domestic point of view, failing to discern clear limits to its application.8 5 Unsurprisingly, the academic
commentary in Argentina has supported the use of public policy as a
means for judicial control of foreign awards. For instance, the National
Court of Appeals for Commercial Matters has relied on an academic definition to characterize public policy as an authorization to the local judge
to determine whether foreign law is adequate to regulate the subject matter of a given dispute.8 6
On its face, the Argentinian courts' interpretation of the public policy
exception does not seem very different from other common interpretations advanced by Latin American national courts. Indeed, Argentinian
courts have defined public policy as the basic and fundamental principle
that underpins the domestic legal system-expressly recognizing the concept of international public policy.8 7 Yet, while in other countries this
idea allows courts to limit the scope of the public policy exception, in
Argentina it has been used to emphasize the role of local courts in protecting national interests. In this regard, Professor Grigera Na6n has suggested that international public policy includes "the basic and
fundamental principles that underlie the Argentine legal system and
82. Id.

83. Id.
84. Id. at 10.
85. Noiana Marigo, supra note 4, at 2.

86. Id. at 2.
87. Enforcement of arbitral awards in Argentina: Overview, PRACTICAL LAw, http://
us.practicaIaw.com/3-619-5542?source=relatedcontent (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
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therefore incarnate interests or principles that are vital for the Argentine
society" and "the mandatory norms ('normas de policfa') of which application is necessary as they protect equally important interests." 88
The definition offered by Professor Grigera Nadn includes two distinctive features that should be emphasized. First, it couples the widely accepted idea that public policy protects the "most important principles" of
a domestic legal system, with the less conventional notion that it also protects the "interests" of Argentinian society.89 While the formula "most
important principles" has a clear legal connotation, the notion of "interests" transpires a less juridical nature, and could arguably include the economic or political goals pursued by a given government.
Second, international public policy is commonly related to the notion
of "normas de policfa," a legal term used to identify mandatory norms of
domestic law that cannot be renounced or modified by private parties
because they regulate acts in which the state has a vested interest. 90 This
term opens the door to interpret public policy as a means to promote the
goals of the Argentinian state. Naturally, this is problematic because one
of the traditional obstacles to the development of international arbitration in Latin America has been the intervention of idiosyncratic courts to
protect state interests.9 1
These positions are confirmed by Argentinian international arbitration
practice. During the last two decades, Argentinian courts have revealed a
tendency toward the disproportionate extension of the notion of public
policy. 92 Some decisions have even proposed that Argentinian courts
should undertake a constitutional review of international arbitration
awards.9 3 Such conclusions contrast considerably with the trend shown
by domestic courts in Colombia, Chile, and Brazil.
The decision in Jost Cartellone Construcciones Civiles SA v. Hidroelctrica NorpatagonicaSA o HidronorSA ("Cartellone")94 adequately illustrates this contrast. As in the Brazilian Keytrade case, in this case the
Court considered whether or not an award granting compound interests
shall be deemed contrary to public policy. Unlike the Brazilian court,
however, the Argentine court opted for annulling the award. 95
88. Horacio Grigera Na6n, Arbitraje Comercial Internacional[International Commercial Arbitration], in Course on International Law XIX 223-242 (Department of
International Law of the Secretariat for Legal Affairs ed., 1992), http://www.oas
.org/es/sla/ddi/docs/223-242.GrigeraNa%C3%B3n92.pdf.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Ossa, supra note 9, at 338.
92. See Roque Caivano, Argentina Necesita Mejorar su Legislacidn Sobre Arbitraje,
155 La Ley 994, 994-999 (1994) (Arg.); see also Noiana Marigo, supra note 4, at 2.
93. See C~mara Nacional de Apelaciones de la Capital Federal [CNCom.] [National
Court of Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital], 8/8/2007, "Mobil Argentina
S.A. c. Gasnor S.A.," La Ley [L.L.] (Arg.).
94. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 8/8/2007, "Jos6 Cartellone Construcciones Civiles SA c. Hidroel6ctrica
Norpatag6nica o Hidronor SA" (Cartellone), La Ley [L.L.] (2004-E-266) (Arg.).
95. Id.
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In the Cartellone case, a dispute arose between the parties of a public
works contract concerning the higher costs incurred by the claimant in
order to comply with its contractual obligations.96 The parties submitted
the dispute to arbitration, and the arbitral tribunal granted damages
against the respondent, an Argentinian governmental agency.9 7 Importantly, the award included compound interests over the awarded
damages.9 8
The award-debtor requested the annulment before Argentine courts,
arguing, inter alia, that the inclusion of compound interests in the award
was unfair and unreasonable.99 The Court rejected this claim stating that
by agreeing to arbitrate the dispute the parties had waived their right to
appeal the award, and thus local courts lacked the power to review the
fairness or reasonability of the award. 100 The award-debtor appealed this
decision before the Argentine Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the
case. 0 1
The Argentinian Federal Supreme Court concluded that the parties
could always request the annulment of an award containing unconstitutional, illegal or unreasonable decisions, and therefore they could not
have waived their right to appeal an arbitral award that was in contradiction with public policy.1 02 The court determined that by granting compound interests, the arbitral award imposed an excessive burden on the
award-debtor incompatible with Argentinian public policy, and thus its
decision was unreasonable and disproportionate.' 0 3 Therefore, the Court
concluded the award should be annulled.
The doctrine set forth in the Cartellonecase has been strongly criticized
04
as a serious threat to the effectiveness of arbitration in Argentina.1
Though some commentators have argued that after the Cartellone case
05
reArgentine courts seem to be moving away from interventionism,
the
public
polto
interpret
courts
continue
cent decisions show that local
96. Id.
97. Id.

98. Id. at 2.
99. Id. at 1.
100. Id. at 7.

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Juzgado Nacional de Primera Instancia [1A INST.] (lower court of ordinary jurisdiction), 27/9/2004, "Entidad Binacional YacyretA c. Eriday y otros", La Ley [L.L.]
(13-06-05) (Arg.). Here, a local court relied on the precedent set in Cartellone to
intervene in the process of selection of arbitrators. In its decision, the lower court
concluded that Argentine courts had the powers to scrutinize the terms of reference of ongoing international arbitrations. For a commentary, see Juana Dioguardi, El Poder (proceso) Judicialy el Control Sobre el Arbitraje Internacional,
REVISTA

I3EROAMERICANA

DiE ARiIrlRAJE Y MEDIACION,

http://www.servilex

.com.pe/arbitraje/colaboraciones/caso-yacyreta.html (last visited July 22, 2016).
105. See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of
Justice], 6/3/2014, "Claren Corporation e/ E.N - arts. 517/518 CPCC exequitur s/
varios", La Ley [L.L.] (06-04-2015) (Arg.).
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icy exception in rather broad terms. 106 Moreover, the inclusion of a
provision in the new Argentine Civil and Commercial Code prohibiting
the parties to waive the right to challenge an award "contrary to the Argentine legal system" suggests that the Cartellone doctrine has been formally incorporated into Argentine law. 107
Of course, Argentinian courts could overrule the Cartellone doctrine
and interpret the applicable legal provisions in a restrictive fashion, which
would be more in line with the trend followed by other Latin American
jurisdictions. Recent developments, however, suggest that national
courts are leaning in the opposite direction. The case Compafiia de Concesiones de Infraestructura S.A. le pide la quiebra Repdblica de Pera
("CCI")108 provides a good example of this tendency.
In the CCI case, the Republic of Peru requested of Argentinian local
courts the enforcement of an ICSID award ordering an Argentinian investor to pay more than two million dollars for the costs of arbitration. 109
The Argentinian court denied recognition of the award, holding that the
award-creditor had not complied with the exequatur procedure set forth
in Argentine law. 110 The Republic of Peru appealed this decision on the
basis of Articles 53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention, which provide that
ICSID awards shall be recognized as final judgments issued by a national
court of the Contracting states.1 11
Though the Argentine Court of Appeals granted the appeal and finally
ordered the enforcement of the award, its decision included an alarming
remark in dicta. 112 As is well known, while international commercial arbitration awards are arguably subjected to some degree of substantive
review by national courts under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, the revision of international investment arbitration awards is
clearly excluded by Articles 53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention. In its
decision, however, the Argentinian court affirmed that national courts
maintained the power to review "in prudence" possible violations of domestic public policy principles, even when required to enforce ICSID
awards.1 1 3
The Court's dictum is quite telling of the position of Argentinian courts
regarding the extension of the public policy exception. Naturally, the
prudential public policy revision proposed in the CCI case is against the
text of the ICSID Convention. The Court's decision indicates, at least
106. See C6digo Civil y Comercial de la Naci6n [COD. CIV. Y COM.]
MERCIAL CODE] art. 1656 (Arg.).

[CIVIL AND COM-

107. C~mara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial de la Capital Federal [CNCom.]
[National Court of Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital], 18/8/2015, "Compafia de Concesiones de Infraestructura S.A. le pide la quiebra Repilblica de
Per", La Ley [L.L] (30-12-2015) (Arg.).
108. Id. at 2.
109. Id. at 1.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 4.
112. Id. at 1.
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theoretically, that Argentinian courts could be willing to disregard the
ICSID Convention in order to secure the enforcement of domestic policies. In the context of international commercial arbitration, where the
public policy exception grants national courts additional arguments to review the substance of an international award, the door opened by the
CCI case raises serious concerns regarding the reliability of Argentina as
a suitable enforcement forum.
V.

CONCLUSION

The reviewed decisions reveal some similarities in the way Latin American courts decide cases involving the public policy exception. These
courts tend to distinguish between international and domestic public policy, interpreting the exception of Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention as protecting only the former. Additionally, they seem to
coincide in reserving international public policy only to the most fundamental principles of a given legal system, and excluding most mandatory
provisions of domestic law. Finally, courts relate the need to restrict public policy with the pro-enforcement project framed by the New York Convention, and with the need of promoting international arbitration as the
preferred mechanism to resolve international disputes.
In contrast with these developments, Argentinian courts have adopted
an expansive interpretation of public policy, including norms of domestic
law that are not specially protected by other courts in the region. This
broad notion of public policy has allowed Argentinian courts to deny the
enforcement of international arbitral awards on the grounds that they
threaten the Argentinian State's interest. Recent decisions suggest that
this tendency could be growing even stronger.
It was an Argentinian Professor who, more than ten years ago, noted
with foresight that the action of a "political pendulum" would render the
development of international arbitration in Latin America a process of
successive progresses and setbacks.1 1 4 As the reviewed cases demonstrate, the disparities regarding the application of the public policy exception provide a unique focal point to analyze the movement of this
pendulum across jurisdictions. Hopefully, the awareness of such disparities will help local courts to stimulate progress and avoid future setbacks.

114. Horacio Grigera Na6n, Arbitration and Latin America: Progress and Setbacks,
21(2) AlRa. INT'L 127, 172-176 (2005).
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